Play as · WW3 2026 · L3 Mid-Power · BRICS+ · ASEAN

Indonesia - 2026

The fourth-most-populous country in the world. The largest Muslim-majority state. The geographic anchor of the Strait of Malacca. The Tentara Nasional Indonesia has expanded steadily under recent administrations; Rafale procurement, F-15EX consideration, KAAN/KF-21 partnership, and indigenous shipbuilding have produced a modernization trajectory that is real if uneven. BRICS+ accession in 2024 was a major signal.

Starting position

Indonesia in 2026 is governed by Prabowo Subianto, who succeeded Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in October 2024. The political transition was anticipated and broadly continuous on foreign-policy fundamentals - non-alignment as updated as "multi-aligned engagement," the Nusantara new-capital project on Borneo continuing, BRICS+ membership consolidating. The Tentara Nasional Indonesia operates a mixed force: F-16s, Su-30MK2s, the new Rafale procurement under delivery, the SIGMA-class frigates and Indonesian Navy expansion projects, and the KF-21 partnership with South Korea producing indigenous fighter capability for the late decade.

Strategic identity is "non-aligned major regional power," updated for the 2020s. Jakarta has resisted explicit US alignment despite Chinese fishing-fleet pressure in the Natuna Sea (the North Natuna Sea designation in 2017 was a quiet pushback against Beijing's nine-dash claims), refused to sanction Russia over Ukraine while supporting Ukrainian humanitarian appeals, and consistently sought to mediate rather than take sides in regional disputes. The economic relationship with China has grown substantially - nickel processing, downstream manufacturing, and infrastructure investment have all expanded.

Strategic levers

The instruments are the demographic and economic mass (Indonesia is the third-largest economy in Asia after China and India by some 2030 projections), the Strait of Malacca and Sunda and Lombok strait positioning that controls major maritime trade routes, the nickel and critical-minerals dominance that makes Indonesia structurally relevant to global EV supply chains, the ASEAN moderating role, and the BRICS+ membership that opens financial alternatives the Bretton Woods institutions don't provide.

What turns the campaign

What Indonesia wants is the non-alignment hedge surviving sharper US-China contest, the Nusantara new-capital project succeeding operationally, the post-Jokowi political settlement producing stable continuity rather than institutional drift, ASEAN solidarity producing diplomatic leverage on South China Sea and Myanmar files, and the critical-minerals downstream-processing strategy delivering economic transformation through the 2030s.

What Indonesia fears is a Taiwan crisis or other US-China confrontation that demands binary alignment, Chinese fishing-fleet escalation in the Natuna Sea that crosses the operational red lines Indonesian forces have established but not fully tested, and the Nusantara project failing to deliver the strategic-economic transformation that would justify its enormous cost. Climate vulnerability - sea-level rise affecting the densely populated Jakarta region - is the underlying structural concern that has motivated Nusantara in the first place.

Signature challenge