Play as · WW3 2026 · L1 · Failed State Recovery

Haiti - 2026

Haiti is the Western Hemisphere's most acute state-failure crisis - the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse left the country without a functional executive, the political-institutional vacuum was filled by the gang coalitions (Viv Ansanm and others) that have controlled most of Port-au-Prince since 2023-24, and the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission deployed in mid-2024 has begun the slow work of contesting that control. Population about 11.5M, GDP collapsed to perhaps $30B PPP. The transitional council established in early 2024 has been the principal political-institutional bridge while the constitutional and electoral frameworks are being reconstituted. The strategic identity is the failed-state-recovery case - the country's path back to functional governance depends on the security operation, the political reconstitution, the international support, and the social-economic recovery, all running simultaneously and all stretched.

Starting position

Haiti's national security forces - Police Nationale d'Haïti (PNH) and the small Forces Armées d'Haïti (FAd'H) re-established in 2017 - have been substantially overwhelmed by the gang coalitions and have been the recipients of substantial international training and equipment support throughout the post-2023 phase. The Kenyan-led MSS mission deployed about 1,000 personnel initially with additional contingents from the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belize, Jamaica, El Salvador, and others bringing total strength toward 2,500 - substantially below the 5,000 originally authorized but operationally engaged in contesting gang control of key infrastructure. The US Department of Defense provides logistics, intelligence, and equipment support without ground forces. The transitional council operates from the Villa d'Accueil, the alternative seat of government after the National Palace was destroyed in 2010 and never rebuilt.

What turns the campaign

What Haiti wants is the MSS mission scaled to the 5,000-personnel authorization that the security situation requires, the gang coalitions' territorial control progressively reduced through the security operation rather than through negotiation that would institutionalize them, the transitional council's political-institutional bridge sustained until elections can be credibly held (currently planned for late 2026 with substantial timeline doubt), the international financial support delivered at the scale that the post-MSS reconstruction will require, and the regional-cooperation architecture (CARICOM, OAS, the post-Trump-administration US engagement) maintained against the periodic withdrawal threats that have characterized US engagement with Haiti for two centuries. What Haiti fears is an MSS withdrawal before the security situation has stabilized, a regional-political reset that downgrades Haiti as a multilateral priority, and a domestic-political crisis that produces a transitional-council collapse before electoral institutions are functional.

Signature challenge